






The Insatiable Sino-Korean Economic Relationship:  
Too Much for Seoul to Swallow? 
 
by Scott Snyder 
Representative, the Asia Foundation/Korea 
 
Despite booming economic and tourist exchanges between Seoul and Beijing, some 
serious economic friction came to the fore in the last quarter.  Officials in Seoul are 
getting a rather nasty taste of Beijing’s inflexibility on several political issues that may 
become serious turning points in the Sino-Korean relationship if not handled effectively.  
Although the dispute over China’s dumping of garlic in the South Korean market was 
settled this quarter--allowing resumed Korean exports of hundreds of millions of dollars 
worth of polyethylene and mobile phone equipment in exchange for an import quota 
ceiling on Chinese garlic exports to Korea--a new, potentially even more damaging 
dispute over lead fragments found in crab and blowfish imports from China has created a 
firestorm of indignation among the Korean public in late August over safety of imported 
Chinese seafood.  These complaints are balanced by continued Korean interest in 
developing China’s information technology (IT) sector, the possibility of China’s 
inclusion in a future Northeast Asian free trade area, and the initiation of practical 
trilateral consultation on financial coordination issues among South Korea, China, and 
Japan.  However, Chinese pressure to block the long-awaited visit of the Dalai Lama, the 
renewal of direct economic links between the ROK and Taiwan, and China’s continued 
detention of scores of ethnic Korean Chinese citizens hired by Korea’s National 
Intelligence Service are among the prickly issues that are being suppressed or postponed 
in anticipation of Chinese Premier Zhu Rongji’s upcoming October visit to Seoul in 
conjunction with the ASEM (Asia-Europe Meeting). 
 
The Bitter Aftertaste of the Garlic Dispute 
 
Only about six weeks were required for Seoul and Beijing to reach a settlement in mid-
July of its biggest trade dispute to date, a dispute over Chinese garlic which had flooded 
the Korean market in 1999, with a ten-fold increase in Chinese market share to 35% of 
the ROK’s garlic market in only one year.  In response to Korea’s punitive 315% tariffs 
on garlic imports from China, Beijing had slapped a ban on imports of polyethylene and 
mobile phone equipment, two rapidly growing sectors for South Korean exporters to 
China that dwarf the size of the garlic trade, causing losses of almost $100 million to 
Korean companies during the period of the dispute.  Beijing’s strategy worked, as Korean 
polyethylene and mobile phone equipment companies quickly mobilized to put pressure 
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on government officials in Seoul to make rational economic concessions.  However, the 
dispute also left a bad taste in the mouths of working-level ROK government officials, 
who reportedly found their Chinese counterparts to be utterly uncompromising and 
parochial in their approach to these trade issues.  This “preview” experience does not 
appear to bode well for the PRC government’s ability to adapt to the requirements that 
will accompany World Trade Organization (WTO) entry. 
 
The compromise on garlic was essentially an ROK concession to allow continued garlic 
imports up to limits slightly less than 1999 levels.  The first 20,000 tons of frozen or 
pickled garlic imports from China are allowable at the usual 30% tariff, while imports in 
excess of that quota would be subject to a 315% punitive tariff, and up to 11,895 tons raw 
garlic imports from China would be permitted subject to a 50% tariff.  The agreement 
essentially attempts to cap Chinese garlic imports in order to contain future damage to 
Korean garlic growers, but accepts the share of the Korean market that Chinese growers 
have already captured during the past year.  The rapid resolution of the garlic dispute was 
a triumph of economic rationality, but with a heavy price to be paid by Korean garlic 
growers.   
 
PRC Ambassador to the ROK Wu Dawei projected that, with the garlic war over, more 
than 1.5 million people would travel between China and South Korea and that bilateral 
trade would reach $32 billion this year, continuing a blistering double-digit pace of 
growth despite the temporary interruption in Korean exports of polyethylene and mobile 
phone equipment. It also re-opens the Korean push for expanded market share in China’s 
telecommunications sector, with the Korean Ministry of Information and 
Telecommunications actively working to push for greater access to the Chinese market 
by Korean firms through adoption of a CDMA (code-division multiple access) mobile 
network to go along side China’s dominant GSM (Global Service for Mobile 
Communication) system.  Unfortunately, the garlic dispute was relatively easy to resolve 
compared to the wide range of agricultural and trade disputes that have already emerged 
to beset Sino-Korean economic relations in the third quarter. 
 
Crabby South Korean Consumers Reject More Iron in Their Diets 
 
No sooner was the garlic dispute settled than a new scandal involving Chinese seafood 
imports arose, this time involving scraps of iron metal inserted into crabs and blowfish, 
ostensibly to increase the price by weight of the various seafood products.  Examination 
of boxes of crabs and blowfish bound for the ROK have revealed a significant number of 
cases in which lead pellets or scraps have contaminated seafood imports. The revelation 
in late July that at least 874 Chinese blue crab and 75 blowfish imports had been 
contaminated with unhealthy metals provoked a firestorm in Seoul, emptied Korean crab 
restaurants, and incited protests against the ROK government’s customs and quarantine 
practices and against Chinese food imports by a number of consumer groups.  
Womenlink, a civic group active in promoting women’s issues, organized demonstrations 
and released a statement complaining that “the recent series of incidents involving tainted 
food have driven us to suspect the safety of all food products at markets. We may have to 
run metal detectors over the seafood on dinner tables.”  The problem is compounded in 
 80
the view of the public by Korea’s increasing dependence on seafood imports from China, 
which constitutes over 41 percent of seafood imports according to the ROK Ministry of 
Maritime Affairs and Fisheries. 
 
Beijing and Seoul have launched investigations into the source of the lead-filled seafood 
products and appear to have narrowed possible suspects to Chinese export houses or 
fishermen possibly based in Dandong, China (apparently excluding the possibility that 
Korean importers may have used the lead to increase the value of the product).  One 
Korean importer, 43-year-old Yang Won-se, was arrested but he denied any knowledge 
that the seafood he was responsible for importing had been contaminated.  PRC 
Ambassador Wu denied sole Chinese responsibility for export of lead-contaminated 
seafood to Korea in a September 8 speech to a forum of ROK National Assembly 
members, suggesting that additional investigations would be needed to determine 
responsibility for the incidents.   
 
The major concern with Korea’s increasing dependency on Chinese food imports is the 
need to guard against the wide range of scams that may constitute a threat to public 
health in the ROK.  For instance, in addition to the use of lead pellets to increase the 
weight of seafood products, Chinese exports to Korea recently included 2,000 tons of 
white sesame seeds that had been coated with toxic tar-based dyes so that they might pass 
as more expensive black sesame seeds, along with herbal medicines that have been mixed 
with stones, bricks, lead pellets, and nails.  In addition, there is growing ill feeling in 
Korea over Chinese protectionism targeted against imports of Korean ginseng to China, a 
long-time leader in international market share. 
 
China Information Technology and Telecoms Gluttony:   
The Bright Side of Sino-ROK Trade Relations 
 
Despite the growing number of Sino-ROK agricultural disputes, the relationship 
continues to be driven by a combination of perceived opportunity to capture a place in 
the growing China market and Korea’s geographic location and ability to produce cost-
competitive, dependable consumer goods for the growing Chinese middle class.  
Location may be less important in a globalized world, but to the extent possible Korean 
companies are seeking to use it to their advantage as a means of getting into the China 
market.  The best example is the bustling demand for ferry and container shipping 
services between Korea and China as a result of limited international port capacity in 
China.  Sixteen new container vessels are to be put into service by the end of the year, 
linking Korea’s Mokpo with China’s Yonun and linking Inchon with China’s Yontae 
city. The Korea International Trade Association projected Chinese demands for large 
consumer goods such as washers, freezers, and televisions to skyrocket, and Korean 
chaebol have gained a significant market share in production low-cost dependable 
household goods that are being sold to Chinese consumers. 
 
The South Korean IT financial bubble during the first half of the year has burst, but the 
shake-out is still in process.  In the meantime, one way of strengthening one’s 
competitive edge both to survive and make oneself attractive to venture investors in the 
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Korean IT sector is to form alliances and become a player in the Chinese IT market, 
particularly in light of China’s anticipated accession to the WTO.  One example of the 
interest in promoting links between Korean and Chinese ventures is an agreement 
between the Korea Overseas Trade Association (KOTRA) and its Chinese counterpart, 
the China Council for Promotion of International Trade (CCPIT), to link website 
databases of Korean and Chinese companies respectively. A major joint Sino-South 
Korean IT Forum was held in Seoul at the end of August with participation from major 
Chinese IT players.  Among the featured speakers were Song Jun, President of Tsinghua 
University Enterprise Group; Sun Jiaguang, member of the Chinese Academy of 
Engineering; and Fang Fang, CEO of Asia2B Holding Ltd. in Hong Kong.  Major tie-ups 
announced during the third quarter included a joint venture consulting firm between 
Beijing-based CAPI Venture led by Majia, the son of a well-known Chinese economist 
Ma Hong, and UTC Venture, a Korean counterpart. Dacom and Shanghai Telecom have 
also agreed to build a high-speed 45M broadband network connecting Korea and China. 
MPMan.com also will supply China’s Founder group with 80,000 MP3 players during 
the next year. 
 
Expanding the Economic Pie: ROK, Japan, and PRC Explore Regional Cooperation 
 
A great deal of discussion on regional economic cooperation has taken place in the 
aftermath of the Asian financial crisis, with two main trends developing that may involve 
trilateral cooperation among South Korea, Japan, and China.  The first initiative is 
focused on expanding regional trade cooperation and has led to specific proposals for a 
free trade zone including South Korea and Japan.  In the course of ROK-Japan 
discussions, however, the Korean vision that has been put forward has usually also 
included Chinese participation.  The latest example is a proposal for a Yellow Sea-Rim 
Free Trade Belt that was pushed by the ROK Ministry of Commerce, Industry, and 
Energy at a meeting with local officials from Kyushu in Japan and has also been actively 
promoted by the Minister of Commerce, Industry, and Energy Shin Kook-hwan.  The 
Ministry has also expressed interest in working with China and Russia to conduct a 
feasibility study on developing a natural gas field in Irkutsk, Russia that could be used to 
supplement Korean and Chinese energy needs. 
 
The second area of potential cooperation has focused on financial sector collaboration 
and has become the primary direct follow-on from the Japan, ROK, PRC breakfast 
meeting among leaders that was held at the ASEAN Plus Three meetings in Manila last 
November.  A three-way economic research project was finally launched in September in 
Beijing to explore possibilities for regional environmental, financial, and trade 
cooperation, particularly in the context of China’s entry into the WTO, which will be led 
by the Korea International Institute of Economic Policy, Dentsu Institute, and the 
Development Research Center under the State Council of the PRC.   
 
Anticipating Zhu Rongji’s Visit:  
A Sweet or Sour Moment for the Sino-Korean Relationship? 
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Much of the activity and seeming lack of activity on the political front during this quarter 
must be seen in light of governmental preparations for the upcoming October bilateral 
meetings with Premier Zhu, the last member of China’s ruling elite to visit Seoul, in the 
context of the ASEM meeting.  The Korean government has used the anticipated visit as 
leverage in its search for a satisfactory result of investigations into Chinese exports of 
lead-contaminated seafood to Korea.  Seoul will also continue to press hard for Zhu to 
authorize expansion of CDMA technology as an acceptable market standard in China’s 
mobile phone sector, a decision that would benefit companies such as Samsung 
Electronics, LG Information and Communications (LGIC), and other Korean exporters 
who recorded 55% increase in exports over last year’s performance in the first half of the 
year.  On the other hand, South Korea has conceded on a wide range of issues in 
anticipation of Zhu’s visit and as part of the ongoing broader perception that China’s 
supporting role is critical to the success of Kim Dae-jung’s engagement of North Korea.  
Most notably, the ROK government has once again stepped back from giving the green 
light to South Korean Buddhist organizations to invite the Dalai Lama for a first-ever 
visit to Korea, after having explained to Chinese counterparts on a number of occasions 
last spring that the South Korean citizenry has increasingly demanded that the 
government allow the Dalai Lama to visit.  The ROK government has also put off 
restoration of direct air links with Taiwan following the election of President Chen Shui-
bian in deference to Chinese wishes.   
 
Perhaps the most apt symbol that Sino-ROK competition has gotten out of hand involved 
some ugly behavior following a 1-0 win by the South Korean national team in a 
“friendly” match held in Beijing last July, where several South Korean spectators were 
physically assaulted by angry Chinese fans, sparking a diplomatic protest by the Korean 
Embassy in Beijing.  Despite “friendly” relations, the current mood is one of bitter 
competition and occasional confrontation just below the surface.  The ROK government 
has thus far kept quiet an ongoing dispute with the PRC over the fate of dozens of ethnic 
Korean Chinese nationals who are being held for suspected ties to South Korea’s 
National Intelligence Service, and has (for the time being) successfully defused further 
public clashes over South Korean non-governmental organization activities involving 
North Korean refugees in China despite occasional continued arrivals of North Korean 
defectors in Seoul via a “third country.”  The ROK government has also proposed 
negotiating an extradition treaty as an increasing numbers of South Koreans who have 
fled from prosecution have taken up residence in China.  One provocative factoid is that 
China has replaced the United States as Korea’s most contentious trading partner, 
according to the Korea Commercial Arbitration Board. 
 
ROK President Kim Dae-jung himself will be eager to sustain Chinese cooperation and 
support for his Sunshine Policy, both in the form of encouraging Chinese interest in and 
support for the inter-Korean railway project that, if implemented, would reconnect ROK 
rail traffic through North Korea to China’s northeast.  Beijing’s interest in the project was 
demonstrated through its offer to assist with minesweeping in preparation for 
reconnecting the railroads in North and South Korea, but that request was turned down 
by the ROK government.  Despite visionary talk about re-establishing a South Korean 
link to the Trans-Siberian Railroad, only the link between South Korea and China 
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through North Korea is likely to have any practical economic significance in terms of 
regional economic integration or trade facilitation.  Kim Dae-jung has also publicly 
commended the Chinese reform experience as a potential model for North Korea’s 
leadership to consider following.  Beijing continues to be an important venue for 
convening inter-Korean dialogue in various forms, the latest and most intriguing of 
which comes in the form of a joint inter-Korean research center on possibilities for 
practical economic cooperation involving officials from the ROK Ministry of Commerce, 
Industry, and Energy. 
 
A more serious issue is how President Kim raises the issue with Premier Zhu of Chinese 
support for the inter-Korean peace process through a “two-plus-two” formula, whereby 
the two Koreas would negotiate a peace treaty to be guaranteed principally by the PRC 
and the United States.  This discussion will be particularly interesting for a variety of 
reasons, including the potential impact of such a discussion on the Sino-U.S. relationship 
and the Korean need for positive U.S.-PRC cooperation on Korean issues as part of Kim 
Dae-jung’s inter-Korean reconciliation strategy.  Most significantly, President Kim’s 
meeting with Zhu Rongji will be the first major top-level meeting following the initiation 
of inter-Korean cooperation.  This factor may change the nature and balance of the 
strategic relationship between Beijing and Seoul, but to what extent and with what effect 








July 11, 2000: Former ROK Foreign Minister Hong Soon-young is formally appointed as 
the ROK’s new ambassador to the PRC. 
 
July 12, 2000: Korea Overseas Trade Association (KOTRA) President Hwang Doo-yun 
and China Council for Promotion of International Trade Chairman Yu Xiaosong sign 
agreement allowing database information sharing regarding Korean and Chinese 
companies between Korea’s Silkroad 21.com and China’s China Products.com. 
 
July 14, 2000: Trade dispute over Chinese garlic exports to South Korea.  
 
July 15, 2000: Representatives from KOTRA and the China External Trade Association 
(CETRA) held their first trade promotion meeting in Taipei since the ROK cut ties with 
Taipei in order to normalize relations with the PRC in 1992. 
 
July 28, 2000: ROK national soccer team wins friendly match against Chinese national 
team in Beijing, sparking altercations and drawing diplomatic protest from the Korean 
Embassy in Beijing. 
 
Aug. 3, 2000: Weekly flight service is established between Beijing and Cheju Island. 
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Aug. 3, 2000: ROK and PRC governments sign a fishing pact designed to clarify limits 
of commercial fishing areas near the mouth of the Yangtze and adjacent to Cheju Island, 
respectively. 
 
Aug. 28, 2000-Sept. 4, 2000: ROK Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman Cho Yung-kil leads a 
week long nine-person delegation to the PRC at the invitation of his PLA counterpart 
Gen. Fu Quanyou, the first-ever visit to China by a Chairman of the ROK Joint Chiefs of 
Staff. 
 
Aug. 31, 2000: Korea-China IT Forum is held in Seoul. 
 
Sept. 4-5, 2000: Japan, ROK, and PRC Environment Ministers agree to launch a 
November workshop on “yellow dust” from China at Fourth Ministerial Conference on 
Environment and Development held in Japan. 
 
Sept. 4-6, 2000: The Ministry of Commerce, Industry, and Energy proposes the 
formation of a Yellow Sea-rim Free Trade Belt at a meeting with Japanese counterparts 
in Kyushu, Japan. 
 
Sept. 5, 2000: South Korea, China, and Japan-based research institute heads discuss 
strengthening economic cooperation between the three Northeast Asian countries in 
Beijing. 
 
Sept. 5-6, 2000: Agreement is signed to conduct feasibility study among the ROK, PRC, 
and Russia on the development of the Irkutsk natural gas oilfield and pipeline by the year 
2008.   
 
Sept. 8, 2000: PRC Ambassador to the ROK addresses a forum of the National Assembly 
Asia Pacific Policy Studies, led by Rep. Moon Hee-sang of the ruling Millennium 
Democratic Party, touching on the issue of China’s tainted seafood imports and the 
PRC’s objections to a visit by the Dalai Lama to Seoul. 
 
Sept. 8, 2000: ROK President Kim Dae-jung proposes to reactivate the Four-Party Talks 
involving the two Koreas, the United States and China, while in New York at the UN 
General Assembly meeting with the idea that a “two-plus-two” format would allow for a 
peace agreement by the two Koreas that would be endorsed by the United States and the 
PRC.   
 
Sept. 8, 2000: Vice Foreign Minister Ban Ki-moon meets with PRC Ambassador Wu 
Dawei to discuss the Chinese tainted food imports, the prospective visit to Seoul by the 





Sept. 17, 2000: The Korean Fair Trade Commission recommends that antidumping 
duties of 26.7% be imposed on Japanese and Chinese batteries deemed harmful to 
domestic industry. 
 
Sept. 18, 2000: ROK government withholds permission for the Dalai Lama to visit Seoul 
on November 16.  Buddhist groups indicate they will pursue the invitation as scheduled 
by seeking public support to overturn the ROK government decision. 
 
Sept. 19, 2000: China Unicom President Yang Xianzu meets with Information and 
Communication Minister Ahn Byung-yub in Seoul and says that Zhu Rongji would 
discuss China’s CDMA market opening with ROK President Kim Dae-jung during his 
visit in October. 
